Obama: Good for Social Change?

What does the social movement literature tell us about Obama?

Well according to William Gamson’s analysis in his classic “The Strategy of Social Protest”, gains by challenging groups (groups that challenge the status quo) come at times of change. His analysis was specifically focused on periods such as the Great Depression but in our economic situation, along with the ideological shift in party politics, we may see change come from the Obama administration that is pushed by social movements organizations (SMOs).

The hypothesized reason for such change is that during such times, the establishment has a full plate (economy, global warming, war, health care) so any contesting groups may be given some of their demands in order to lessen their policy load.

Gamson found that usually it is organizations that existed before the crisis or critical period that win gains rather than up-and-coming organizations but that may be due to the length it takes the groups to get properly mobilized, in which case, if new groups are quickly mobilized they may have a better shot at victory with a troubled yet ideologically idealistic Obama administration, rather than the previous Bush administration.

Aside from Gamson’s findings, the social movements literature on “political opportunities” is highly informative on the question of Obama and the possibility for social change:
– social movements win demands more frequently when political opportunities open up.
– when candidates run and win on a platform of change, people’s expectations lead the candidates to at least appear to the public as beacons of change.
– When contesting groups mobilize and get mass support, the politicians rhetoric is threatened if nothing is done.
– Negotiations happen between the social movement organizations and the administration.
– Some policies are adopted.

In addition, Sidney Tarrow writes, “Reform is most likely to result when challengers from outside the polity provide political incentive for minority elites within it to achieve their own policy goals. Reform often results less from direct demands of individual protest movements than from a subjective or objective coalition between reformers within the polity and challengers who initiate collective action outside it.”
(Cooperative Perspectives on Social Movements)

From a radical perspective, large social change will not occur based on the administration in charge, but the administration allows for key “non-reformist reforms” to be won.

In this respect, even radical social movements organizations should see some benefits to an Obama administration.

OSCAR GRANT PROTEST: A RESPONSE

THIS POST IS A RESPONSE TO: http://advancethestruggle.wordpress.com/2009/07/15/justice-for-oscar-grant-a-lost-opportunity/

Though I agree with the central points of this article, I think the way the author(s) examine(s) the issues is not as useful as it could be if we are to be serious about winning any kind of change.

Though the article addresses WHAT we want to win with the struggle surrounding Oscar Grant, it does not sufficiently pose, let alone answer, the question of HOW to win.

The article does seem to be in favor of “militant action” in one form or another, but it does not explain for example how high school student walk outs will create change (do they qualify as being militant?). This problem which can be also found in the author’s citations (namely, Bob Avakian and Gramcsi) of theoreticians and not social scientists. Basically, anyone can theorize about change, and how to accomplish it but it does not make it a social reality. A philosopher can think of a logical way in which sipping coffee can turn into a revolution. This does not help those of us who actually want change.

Those of us who actually want change are going to need to put down our books on theory and pick up a book on social movements.

So what solutions do we have from a social science perspective? Well an important lesson we can learn is that if nothing else, militant forms of protest allow groups such as CAPE to more easily win their struggle for small changes within the police department by making using that group as a acceptable negotiator.

Another important thing to learn from the social sciences is the cost-benefit analysis the state will make in how it judges the Mehserle trial and proceedings. George Ciccariello-Maher’s article “Oakland is Closed!” does a good job in explaining the tactical benefits of the militant protests of the Jan 7 rebellion. Basically, the city of Oakland, at that time had to decide whether or not to arrest Mehserle and what to charge him with. There’s a good argument for the police charging him based on the idea that it would pacify the irate protesters from further property damage. This same theory can apply to Mehserle’s conviction and sentencing but due largely to the lack of rioting it seems that Mehserle, thanks to the powerful police union behind him, will be acquitted.

So what kind of systemic change would we see if Mehserle is indeed convicted? Likely none, but more cops would think before they pulled the trigger and this victory is no laughing matter.

The radical, systemic change which the article tries to argue for is one that takes a long time to win and one where the protest aspect is necessary but insufficient. (For more on this you can read Bill Moyer’s book “Doing Democracy” or check out this video: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=17iITob04t4). It requires lots of consciousness raising and issue framing (See George Lakoff) in order to appeal to moderate and even conservative people.

This process does not stop with the Oscar Grant issue and therefore cannot be centered around his murder. But if we return to the argument that the property destruction creates gains, however liberal, then we need not care whether they are started by anarchists or is organic, nor should we necessarily care whether or not Oakland residents approve of such tactics. (A small survey results found all those surveyed to view property destruction as negative and violent regardless of how they perceive the Oscar Grant issue.) The militant tactics hurt the image of Oakland and brings in national media coverage that, despite showing the protest as being a horrible band of anarchists, also so the city of Oakland as a dirty, violent place. This image hurts every Oakland elite politically and therefore they want to pacify them either by force, which may lead to more protest and outrage, or by appeasement.

Reflections on Citizen Movements: Peace and Politics in the U.S and Japan | Thirteen Forum

This Video features Tom Hayden, James Orr, and Amy Goodman as they discuss framing of and stages of social movements.

Reflections on Citizen Movements: Peace and Politics in the U.S and Japan | Thirteen Forum

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Tom Hayden presents a protest stage progression that looks very similar to what Bill Moyer (not to be confused with the PBS journalist) had in mind with his Movement Action Plan (MAP).

James Orr discusses protest in Japan and the way culture, the media, and state shape the representation and framing of issues.

The Power of Organizing Without Organizations

A discussion about new media and person2person (p2p) networks that looks at 1) how to organize without an organization, 2) new technologies used in social movements and 3) how these tactics affect strategy.

How Protests Work: winning struggles and goals by protesting

Here is a quote by Sidney Tarrow from “Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements” that interestingly discusses the effects of protesting:

“In fact, the analysis of real-life situations of protest and reform shows that protesters on their own seldom have the clout to affect the policy proprieties of elites. This is both because their protests take an expressive and nonreformist form and because elites are unlikely to be persuaded to make policy changes that are not in their interest by challengers outside the system.

Reform is most likely to result when challengers from outside the polity provide political incentive for minority elites within it to achieve their own policy goals. Reform often results less from direct demands of individual protest movements than from a subjective or objective coalition between reformers within the polity and challengers who initiate collective action outside it. It follows that reformist policies seldom correspond to the claims of the protesting groups; indeed, reforms triggered by their efforts sometimes provide benefits to groups other than themselves, which foes a long way to explaining the radicalization that is often typical of such groups after the reformist response to their claims.

Political elites are most likely to behave in a reformist way when there are political advantages to be gained from it. Political opportunism is not a monopoly of either Left or Right, parties of movement or parties of conservation. Thus the (conservative) Eisenhower administration responded in essentially the same was as the (liberal) Kennedy administration to the challenge of the civil rights movement – for the simple reason that both were suffering electoral challenges in the South (Piven and Cloward 1979: chap. 4)”

Whale Wars and Strategy

This week I was introduced to a show on Animal Planet called “Whale Wars”, which tracks an organization headed by a Greenpeace co-founder called the Sea Shepherd Conservation Society.

The show tracks a ship, whose crew consists of environmental activists, in their attempt to disrupt Japanese whaling fleets who found a loophole in an international law which allows them to hunt and kill whales for “scientific research”.

The show explores interesting aspects of internal group dynamics and strategy. This post is meant to briefly discuss these topics and relate it to an event the Sea Shepherds’ actually experienced on the show.

Internal group dynamics are formal and informal processes of group decision making and cohesion. This includes, for example, group hierarchy, which impacts group cohesion if the decision-makers continually make decisions against the wishes of other members. In addition, the hierarchy (or lack thereof) often affects the speed at which a decision is made.

In “Whale Wars”, the Captain of the ship (the Steve Irwin) is Paul Watson and though he takes our people’s opinions into consideration, he effectively has the final say in deciding on the course of action the ship takes. In one episode, the Sea Shepherds run across the Japanese whaling fleet who are looking for a member of the whaling fleet who either fell off or jumped off the boat. The activist crew seems to favor continuing a harassment campaign against the ships, save one crew member, even though the whalers are in a search and rescue mission, not a whaling mission. Despite many of the members drive to push on with the mission, the Captain decides to offer help in the search and rescue operation.

Decisions such as these are made strategically, and while not every decision the captain makes is explained strategically, certain pros and cons are weighed. In the previous example, the captain and crew each had to balance a) a moral decision and b) a goal-oriented strategic decisions. The moral decision (which lies outside any strategic realm) weighed the odds of trying to save the whales and attacking a fleet that was searching for a crew member in open waters. The strategic decision does not turn a blind eye to the moral question, but rather, looks at the ethical dilemma through the lens of outsides. The lens is not myopic in scope. It can include: a) the general public, b) potential sources of funding for the organization, c) legal actors, d) the activist crew members, and e) the whaling fleet’s crew members.

To be more specific, a) the Sea Shepherd would like to increase their approval among the general public who may hear about this incident in the news or on the TV show. The decision should weigh what the general public would favor, or more accurately, what the Captain believes the general public would favor.

b) Since the Sea Shepherd is a non profit organization, they seek outside donations as a source of funding. It is likely that if an organization acts in an unethical way, as perceived by a potential donor, they may decide to give elsewhere. Therefore, it is important for the Captain to weigh the perceived choice a wealthy donor would make in his position.

c) The Captain and crew must also weigh the perception an act such as harassing the whaling fleet during a search and rescue operation within a legal and judicial framework. Is there a more severe law which prohibits them from harassing a ship at this time? Will this be frowned upon by a judge even if it is not illegal?

d) The Captain needs to make sure that his decision does not severely alienate any important crew members on his own ship. He does not want a mutiny or to lose someone with valuable skills or experience.

e) Though the whaling fleet is a corporate enterprise with only profit on its mind, the crew members are live human beings that make their own ethical decisions. Showing an effort to help the ship in the search and rescue may show to the whaling crew that these so called eco terrorists are not so bad after all.

Aside from strategizing around others’ perceptions of your decision, a strategy needs to way other aspects of the effectiveness each choice offers. In this example, the Sea Shepherd’s low fuel level limited the length of any possible harassment campaign whether or not the whaling fleet was trying to rescue a crew member.

Of course, not every area that needs to be strategized around (e.g. general public, donors, etc…) need to be weighed equally in the final decision. Perhaps the organization is not worried about funding for the time being or does not see a strategic value in changing the minds of the whaling crew.

Was the captain’s decision strategically smart??

Each person can make their own assessment.

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